Crew Resource Management (CRM) 
Two chilling statistics were raised early during the December 1990 (Scahill, 1991, p. 43) However, we have endured such losses for many years and, unfortunately, many of the loses were a result of human failing. Historically, the 1961 crash of a British aircraft in Norway was one of the first documented cases of a flight crew performance-related accident. Listed among the contributing factors of that accident were the added stress of a long delay prior to departure coupled with poor destination weather and:
the Viking used to fly with two pilots and a radio officer. There is a third seat for this third man in the cockpit. But then it became standard procedure to fly the Viking without the radio officer. He was regarded as redundant. A change in philosophy you know.
Withoutsubstituting new mechanical aids, his absence meant extra workload for the pilots. They could cope with it, in normal circumstances.
Others have been coping with it ever since. (Barlay, 1970, p. 12.) JAAER, Fall 1992 In another accident (NTSB- Concurrently, Boeing (one of only three Western world manufacturers of large turbojet transports) has placed over 400 high-technology Boeing 757s and 767s into service with U.S. airlines. Cockpits in these aircraft have led their two-pilot crews to refer to the aircraft as "electric jets."
As pilots have moved into high-technology cockpits requiring new skills, they are finding that recurrent training to comply with regulations is akin to a professor reciting the alphabet to a government monitor every six months. (Ott, 1990, p. 68) In August 1987, then FAA Administrator T. Allan McArtor urged the development of a joint government/ industry task force to study flight crew performance. Among other perceived problems on air carrier flight decks, the task force addressed flight crew training. The task force forwarded to FAA a A Turning Point series of recommendations to improve the flight crewmember operating environment, knowledge of human factors, and pilot training. The result has been SFAR 58, which outlines the steps an airline can take to establish its own AQP--an FAA-approved training program.
The AQP will be an alternative method for meeting training, evaluation, certification, and qualification requirements for the following: flight crewmembers (pilOts and flight engineers), flight attendants, aircraft dispatchers, instructors, evaluators, and other operations personnel, e.g., aircraft mechanics. An objective of the AQP will be to enhance these professionals' qualifications above the standards of Parts 121 and 135. This article will encompass only Part 121 flight crewmember training.
Utilization of a systematic approach to training analysis, curriculum development, implementation, and evaluation will be fundamental to the AQP. Another fundamental underpinning of this program will be proficiencybased training and qualification. Time spent in AQP training will be quality, planned hours instead of programmed hours. Training will be conducted until the student night cre~ember successfu~ly completes the program.
All AQPs will require the incorporation of CRM and LOS in the curriculums. Accordingly, the AFS-210 has published FAA Advisory Circulars (ACs) 120-51 (1989) and 120-35B (1990b) covering, respectively, CRM training and evaluation and LOS training and evaluation. Additionally, the SUbjects of ACs 120-45A (l990a) and 120-40B (1991b) are, respectively, FIDs and Airplane Simulator Qualification. AC 120-54 (1991a) with the subject matter of the AQP has been published and will be discussed later in this article. (Sams, 1987) .
During the mid-1980s, Helmreich (1984) began to clarify the much maligned term "pilot error." Helmreich and NASA research demonstrated that the majority of air carrier transport accidents were caused by failures in team communication and coordination.
Most of us are familiar with the common stereotype of the pilot as a fearless, self-sufficient, technically qualified, and sligh tly ego tis tical individual, whose job description calls for the defiance of death on a regular basis. (Foushee and Helmreich, 1988, p. 191) . Pilots with such traits were unlikely to function well in the multi-pilot crew when there was a need for teamwork and group decision making.
The FAA has allowed air carriers some latitude in developing their own unique approaches to CRM. This latitude may be attributable to a lack of a uniform, industrywide definition of how to approach such training. Specifically, the FAA (1989) has defined CRM with seven basic concepts and recommends four phases of teaching, while Sams (1987) listed numerous additional sources of CRM concepts and training strategies. Schwartz (1987) , on the other hand, listed 10 topics associated with CRM which closely parallel the 14 CRM tools delineated (for statistical purposes) by Helmreich, Wilhelm, Gregorich, and Chidester (1990) . Indeed, there have been many definitions of CRM.
Helmreich et at (1990) reported the first data from the NASAlUniversity of Texas Crew Performance project on the behavior of flightcrews with and without formal CRM. Fifteen rating areas of CRM included 14 areas of behavior (the tools) and the overall evaluation. Both LOFr scenarios and line operations were studied at two air carriers; one with CRM and LOFr already in place, and the other in early initiation of both. The results indicated that a formal CRM program resulted in an increased percentage of crews rated as above average in performance. There was also a decrease in the percentage rated as below average.
Classroom training of CRM has traditionally created a subset of tlight crewmembers JAAER, Fall 1992 who react negatively (Helmreich and Wilhelm, 1989) . The incorporation of crew as well as individual CRM evaluations in LOS scenarios is designed into the AQP to address this problem. The mandated combination of CRM and LOS evaluations has been designed to address communications in two-pilot crews. Kanki, Lozito, and Foushee (1989) concluded that standardizationofcommunication patterns enhances the performance of the two-pilot crew; and Wiener (1989) addressed this problem specifically in the "glass cockpit" aircraft. The electric jets studied by Wiener pose problems at the human-automation interface. Incorporation of standard communications, and the appropriate separation of the human from the automation, will be quintessential to the CRM and LOS ingredients of an AQP designed to properly interface flight crewmembers and the airplanes they fly.
In discussing situational awareness, SChwartz (1987) (Buch and Diehl, 1984) . However, if a formal judgment matrix were designed, it must not conflict with any FAA legalities, approved procedures, or checklists; or any of the air carrier's operational policies.
Line Operational Simulations (LOS) will utilize scenarios of operational problems and environmental conditions. LOS elements will be similar to those of LOFT: (a) a line environment; (b) a complete crew, with no substitution of instructors or evaluators; (c) random real world, real time scenarios; and (d) the option of runs which are uninterrupted. In addition, unlike LOFr, the simulations must include evaluation of each crewmember, crew competence, and crew performance (FAA, 1990b) . EVALUATIONS AND DATA A small, random sample of flight crewmembers would be among the first crews enrolled in an air carrier's early AQP.
An audit and analysis of performances by this group would serve as a formative evaluation of the AQP courseware for technical accuracy, instructional soundness, and suitability for use. Additionally, simulator flight proficiency training will permit flight crewmembers to experience and practice events which are not normally encountered in day-to-day flight operations. The training to proficiency will necessitate the evaluation of crews and individuals. Results of data obtained from this process can be evaluated, possibly necessitating curriculum revisions.
Crew members will be provided with forms to evaluate the AQP. These evaluation forms will be comprised of several Likert scale questions, and questions or statements soliciting comments. Likert scales may be from "1" to "5", or "1" to "7"; the Likert extremes could be from: Unrealistic to Realistic; Easy to Difficult; Poor to Well; Useless to Useful; Absolutely nothing to A tremendous amount; or Strongly disagree to Strongly agree.
Sample questions and statements soliciting comments are an important, integral part of the evaluation process. The CRM advisory circular 120-51 (1989) incorporates a sample student evaluation as well as other guidelines for student evaluations. For the AQP, sample questions could be: The FAA (199Oc) has mentioned the AQP as possibly extending the time between crewmember visits to the training center as a financial consideration for air carriers. However, ALPA (1990) believes that the time between visits to the training center should not be extended beyond the annual recurrent and six-month proficiency checks that are now required. Ott (1990) (FAA, 199Oc) .
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The AQP front-end curriculum development may also result in an initial analysis of JAAER, Fall 1992 training system devices and motion-based simulation. The consequence of such analysis may be the utilization of more FTDs in the curriculum. This utilization may also drive the FAA and/or NASA to further study motion-based simulation and its transfer of training to transport category aircraft operations. Experimental results of the transfer of training with motion-based simulation may end the question of duplicity which exists today with respect to air carrier simulation.
Other regions of the world are experiencing rates of crewcaused air carrier accidents greater than that of the U.S.; some of these goo-regional rates are in excess of six times greater than the U.S. rate. Given today's globalized society, future research should probably evaluate the human factors and crew training approaches for the air carriers of the following regions: Europe, AsialPacific, Latin America, and Africa/Middle East.
Perhaps there will be a true turning point in aviation training, but it is yet to be determined whether the certificated air carriers will readily embrace this new concept or whether the AQP will have the intended effect on aviation safety. There are several air lines that have already progressed to Phase 2 of the AQP. As of this date, United, Delta, and Northwest Airlines have reached this stage, and several additional major airlines and regionals are progressing with AQP.
AC 120-54 seems to be a landmark attempt at providing a framework for the industry and the FAA to work more A Turning Point closely in concert than ever before. IT this joint association bears fruit, it may provide innovative ways to better prepare not only flight crewmembers but flight attendants, aircraft dispatchers, instructors, evaluators, and other operations personnel subject to the training and evaluations requirements of FAR parts 121 and 135. This enabling movement could serve as the catalyst to assist a flight crews to better work together. The time may finally be at hand when the manner in which the whole process of cockpit interaction and~anagement of resources will be talked about less and acted upon more completely. 
